The Woodridge Model

We at Twenty-One Debunked clearly support lowering the drinking age to 18, as well as also setting the age limit for tobacco and cannabis at 18, but there is clearly more than one model to choose from.  For the one we favor, we have decided to call it the Woodridge Model, named after the famously successful tobacco policy of the town of Woodridge, Illinois in the 1990s on which it is based.  Thus, when we use the term "Woodridge Model", we are using it as shorthand for the following, whether applied to alcohol, tobacco, cannabis, or anything else.

The following can be considered "core" components of the Woodridge Model:

• Purchase/sale age limit of 18
• Enforcement directed primarily, if not exclusively, towards vendors
• Retail licensing system (state or local) for vendors to sell such products.
• Compliance checks on vendors, with the goal of achieving 100% vendor compliance
• Relies much more on administrative fines and especially license suspensions/revocations for vendors rather than criminal penalties (if the latter even exist at all)
• Heightened awareness and energy at the grassroots level concerning the above

The following can be considered "optional" or "ancillary" secondary components, which may or may not be included in versions of the Model:

• Modest civil fines, no worse than a minor parking or traffic violation (with no arrests, no jail time, no criminal record), for people under 18 caught purchasing, using, or possessing (PUP) the substance in question--if we must
• Giving law enforcement officers the authority to confiscate the substances in question from people under 18 found in possession.
• A higher age limit than 18 specifically for bulk quantity purchases only (kegs, cases, etc.)
• Laws against buying for or privately furnishing the substances in question to people under 18
• Educational initiatives aimed at young people as well as the general population
• Excise taxes on the substances in question
• Advertising restrictions 
• Laws against driving under the influence
• Laws against possession or use of fake IDs
• Any other regulations on the substances unrelated to age

The following measures are excluded from the Model, and the presence of one or more of them inherently vitiates the Model and thus causes it to cease to exist as such:

• Any age limit higher than 18 for possession, consumption, and/or (non-bulk) purchase
• Any criminal penalties, criminal records, arrests, or jail time, however slight, for underage purchase, possession or consumption 
• Any driver's license sanctions (i.e. suspension or revocation) for substance-related status offenses unrelated to operating a motor vehicle 
• Prioritizing enforcement against anyone other than vendors more so than vendors 
• Lack of significant vendor compliance checks, or only half-hearted ones
• Most, if not all social host liability laws
• Having no age limit at all, for obvious reasons (any age limits less than 18 will be referred to as "Woodridge-Lite")
• And, of course, banning the substances in question completely for all ages would make the Model inherently impossible

Thus, whenever we talk about the Woodridge Model, this is what we mean.  If it works that well (from a public health perspective) for something as highly addictive as tobacco, at a time when cigarettes were fairly popular among young Americans and about as common as toothpicks in this country, there is no reason why it wouldn't work for alcohol, cannabis, or anything else for that matter in this day and age.  And while it may not be perfect, if we make the perfect the enemy of the good, we ultimately end up with neither.

(Note that we are certainly NOT referring to Woodridge proper's youth curfew law when we talk about the Model, as that goes against what Twenty-One Debunked fundamentally stands for.  We are referring solely to the policies discussed above.)

Examples of Woodridge-inspired models in action on a larger scale include most of New York State excluding NYC and a few other counties (and in fact the entire state until fairly recently) for tobacco, Puerto Rico (especially Old San Juan) for alcohol since the late 1990s, the United Kingdom for alcohol and tobacco since 2004 and 2007, respectively, and The Netherlands for cannabis since 1996.  And in fact, the entire (pre-2020) federal Synar Program for tobacco can be considered a mild Woodridge-inspired model writ large, with notable success.  Though setting the program's minimum compliance threshold (i.e. "passing grade") at 90% or 95% would be far more effective than the current paltry 80%, since it is much easier for underage buying attempts to succeed if 1 in 5 retailers is willing to sell compared with 1 in 20.

It appears that disrupting the retail sale to underage youth under 18 actually does work on balance to reduce underage use of tobacco or whatever other substance in question, both directly as well as through knock-on, cascading disruption of "social sources" (since they are more likely to get it from each other than anyone else).  After all, generosity has its limits, and convenience (or lack thereof) of access appears to be at least as important as the monetary price of the substance for that age group.

So why does it work, despite being so modest and (relatively) non-violent?  We have some theories.  First, targeting sellers rather than young users implies that the latter are victims rather than villains, and young people generally don't think it's "cool" or "edgy" to be a victim (unlike a villain).  Second, when 100% vendor compliance (or nearly so) is actually achieved in a given community, the reduced access to the substance in question appears to greatly outweigh any "forbidden fruit" effect, at least when the age limit is 18.  Third, the heightened education and awareness, broadly defined, undoubtedly has an effect as well.  Fourth, the Model does not labor under the divide-and-conquer aspect that targeting users does, thus allowing communities to maintain a united front without alienating young people too much.  Fifth, there are far fewer retailers than there are young people, making it far more cost-effective to target the former.  And finally, an age limit of 18 is far more realistic than anything higher, and would have much more grassroots support in theory and practice.

In fact, one could argue that a Woodridge-inspired model is the only type that is thoroughly consistent with a true public health approach.  Combine it with higher excise taxes and advertising restrictions, and you would then have the trifecta in that regard.

WHAT ABOUT NEEDHAM, MA?

This question inevitably comes up whenever any reference to age limits and tobacco are discussed together in any way.  It is true that the small town of Needham, MA, the first place in the USA to raise their tobacco sale age to 21 in 2005 (with a grandfather clause), saw their teen smoking rates drop by nearly half between 2006 and 2010, much faster than in surrounding communities that had no change in their age limits.  But Needham also increased their enforcement on vendors in a Woodridge-like fashion as well, and also had at least some other tobacco laws that surrounding communities lacked.  And the percentage of smokers under 18 who bought their own cigarettes from stores also declined in Needham but not in the other towns.  Thus, it is very likely that the decline in teen smoking would have been just as large had they kept the age limit at 18 but stepped up enforcement all the same, ceteris paribus.

In fact, as we just recently learned, the rate of decline in teen smoking rates in the surrounding communities not only eventually caught up to that of Needham, but actually exceeded Needham by 2014 despite the neighboring towns keeping their age limits at 18.  And while many of these other towns eventually raised it to 21 by 2016, they actually then saw a slight increase in teen smoking from 2014-2016.  (You read that right.)  Thus, the supposed Needham "miracle" turned out to be just a mirage all along.

Indeed, one should note that Woodridge proper saw a similarly large drop in teen smoking in an even shorter timeframe (just two years) from 1989 to 1991 while keeping the smoking age at 18.  Leominster, MA also saw a drop almost as large from 1989 to 1991 as well.  And NYC, who raised their age limit from 18 to 21 (with no grandfather clause) in 2014, did NOT see teen smoking rates drop any faster than in the nation as a whole from 2013 to 2015.  Thus, the most parsimonious explanation of all is that Needham's (relatively short) success story was primarily (if not entirely) due to increased vendor enforcement interacting with secular trends, and not the actual raising of the age limit itself.

Oh, and by the way, Massachusetts, like New York, does NOT have any laws or penalties against purchase, use, or possession (PUP) under the legal age.  And neither do any of the localities within these two states discussed here as well.  Thus, the onus falls entirely on the sellers, not the buyers, and so our theory actually applies a fortiori to Needham.