Showing posts with label price. Show all posts
Showing posts with label price. Show all posts

Friday, November 13, 2026

Case Closed: Minimum Unit Pricing Works

Now that it has been quite some years that Scotland (followed by Wales and Ireland) has implemented Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) for alcohol (a price floor per unit of alcohol content of beverages across-the-board), we decided to revisit this by asking Dr. Google about its overall public health/safety effectiveness:

Minimum unit pricing (MUP) sets a legal floor price for a unit of alcohol, targeting cheap, high-strength off-trade drinks to reduce overall consumption and health harms. [1, 2]
Key Effects of MUP
  • Reduction in Alcohol Consumption: Evaluations of MUP (such as in Scotland) show a net reduction in adult alcohol sales and consumption of about 3%, with the largest drops occurring among households that previously purchased the most alcohol. Low-volume drinkers are largely unaffected. [1, 2, 3]
  • Declines in Mortality: Studies published in The Lancet indicate a 13.4% reduction in deaths wholly attributable to alcohol, driven primarily by drops in chronic conditions like alcoholic liver disease and alcohol dependence syndrome. [1, 2]
  • Lower Hospital Admissions: Population-level data shows a 4% to 4.1% decrease in alcohol-attributable hospitalizations, with particular reductions in chronic admissions. [1, 2]
  • Improved Health Equity: The largest health gains and reductions in deaths occur among the most socioeconomically deprived groups and heavy-drinking populations, actively narrowing health inequalities. According to research tracked by the Sheffield Addictions Research Group, impacts are heavily concentrated where harmful drinking is most prevalent. [1, 2, 3]
  • Industry and Revenue Impact: MUP is a floor price rather than a government tax; the extra revenue generated from higher retail prices goes to producers and retailers rather than the state. Comprehensive reviews show no consistent negative impact on the overall alcoholic drinks industry. [1, 2]
  • Wider Social Harms: Real-world data reveals negligible or inconsistent impacts on broader social issues such as crime, road traffic accidents, or illicit drug substitution. [1, 2]
  • Inflationary Pressure: High inflation can erode the real-world purchasing power of a fixed floor price over time, requiring governments to periodically adjust and raise the MUP rate (e.g., Scotland raising its rate from 50p to 65p) to maintain its effectiveness. [1]
The Northern Territory of Australia also implemented an MUP as well in 2018, but they eventually repealed it in 2025, apparently under pressure from the alcohol industry lobby.  But while it lasted, it seemed to be beneficial there as well.  And the biggest irony is that MUP actually increases the alcohol industry's net revenue, both retail and otherwise, despite a drop in consumption, since alcohol is relatively price-inelastic.  Unlike with taxes, which go to the government, the price difference from MUP goes right to the sellers.  Again, per Dr. Google:

Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) generally increases overall revenue and profit margins for alcohol retailers, even though it reduces the total volume of alcohol sold. Because MUP establishes a legal floor price rather than a government tax, the extra money paid by consumers on low-cost, high-strength drinks stays directly within the retail and supply chain. [1, 2, 3, 4]
And lest we forget about the Canadian province of Saskatchewan, the very first jurisdiction to implement such a price floor based on alcohol content (unlike other Canadian provinces and some US states that do it based simply on overall volume, a dangerous loophole which perversely incentivizes the consumption of stronger beverages).  And while Saskatchewan's price floor varies a bit by beverage category, it is still graded for alcohol content within each category, thus making it broadly similar to a textbook version of MUP.  We asked Dr. Google about that as well:

Saskatchewan’s introduction of strength-graded minimum alcohol pricing (starting in April 2010) produced measurable effects across consumption, public health, and public safety: [1]
Effects on Alcohol Consumption
  • Overall Reduction: A 10% increase in minimum prices was associated with an overall drop in per capita alcohol consumption of about 8.43%. [1, 2]
  • Shifts by Beverage Type:
    • Beer consumption fell by 10.56% (with high-strength beer >6.5% ABV dropping by 22.0%).
    • Cocktails decreased by 21.3% and coolers by 13.2%.
    • Spirits decreased by 5.87%, wine by 4.58%, and liqueurs by 5.3%. [1, 2]
  • Behavioral Shifts: Consumers noticeably reduced overall intake and switched away from high-strength, low-cost "bang-for-your-buck" products toward lower-alcohol options. Off-premise sales (liquor stores) saw much larger drops than on-premise sales (bars and restaurants).
Effects on Health and Emergency Services
Emergency Department (ED) Visits: In Regina, data showed a 39.4% decrease in motor-vehicle collision (MVC) related ED visits for women aged 26 and older after a six-month lag. Rates of ED visits among young males for MVCs and assaults also declined substantially.
Effects on Crime and Safety
Nighttime Incidents: Police and regional tracking noted marked reductions in night-time alcohol-related crimes, violence, and disorderly conduct following the implementation of higher, strength-adjusted price floors.

As for any supposed adverse effects of MUP, such as resulting from very heavy and dependent drinkers switching to hard liquor, those effects are fairly minimal and short-term, and would be exceedingly unlikely if it was ever implemented in the USA, since low-end hard liquor is generally so cheap here that it would likely see the largest net price hikes (compared to other beverages) resulting from MUP.  And in any case, phasing in the MUP hike gradually would minimize any such possible effects.

(For the USA, an MUP of $1.00 per American standard drink in 2026 dollars is what we at Twenty-One Debunked would now recommend to start with, phased in over several weeks or months, and then indexed to inflation from then onwards.)

And there you have it.  Ergo, albeit after a time lag, and temporarily confounded by extraneous short-term variables such as the upheaval of the COVID-19 pandemic, it seems that MUP, especially when implemented in conjunction with moderately high alcohol taxes, can have very significant public health benefits, at least in the long run.  Even in cultures like Scotland whose drinking problems are as ingrained as they are legendary, it still seems to work well, apparently.  It is, in short, the ideal alcohol policy.  Simple, surgical, and effective.  Case closed.

Sunday, February 2, 2025

Thomas Jefferson Predicted Exactly Why Minimum Unit Pricing Would Fail

Looks like good old Thomas Jefferson, the third President of the United States and one of America's Founding Fathers, had uncannily predicted long ago why the recent "Minimum Unit Pricing" of alcoholic beverages in Scotland and Wales would end up failing so miserably even on its own terms:

"No nation is drunken where wine is cheap; and none sober where the dearness of wine substitutes ardent [i.e. distilled] spirits as the common beverage. It is, in truth, the only antidote to the bane of whiskey."

And there you have it.  Substitute "beer" or "cider" for "wine" and it still makes just as much if not more sense, especially in the UK.  That is NOT to say that the price mechanism (via taxation or otherwise) is useless, far from it.  All else being equal, we know that higher alcohol prices = fewer alcohol-related problems and deaths, at least to a point.  But the Jeffersonian wisdom above DOES add a VERY important nuance, namely that the RELATIVE price of less-concentrated alcoholic beverages (beer, wine, cider) compared with the more-concentrated distilled spirits (hard liquor) is more important than the absolute prices of either.

Consider this:  the UK as a whole already had, and still has, fairly high but (until recently) very uneven taxes on alcohol to begin with.  Wine and especially cider have long enjoyed lower taxes (and thus lower prices per standard drink) compared with beer and hard liquor there.  Thus, the heaviest problem drinkers, especially poorer ones, often went for cheap and strong cider to get the most "bang for the buck".  Enter minimum unit pricing, a price floor across the board per standard drink which had a much larger effect on raising the price of cider compared with hard liquor.  The unintended consequence?  At least some of the heaviest drinkers likely at least partially switched to liquor as a result, and ended up getting drunker than they otherwise would, with predictable negative effects.

That said, in the USA where alcohol taxes are much lower, especially for distilled spirits, such a price floor may very well be a net benefit overall.  And even in the UK, changing it to a two-tier price floor where distilled spirits would have a higher minimum price per standard drink than non-distilled beverages may very well too.  But as it stands currently in Scotland and Wales?  It's generally pretty weak sauce at best as far as public health is considered.

Oh, and don't ever expect MADD or their adjacents to admit this either.  They have in the past at least half-heartedly called for higher beer taxes, of course, but remained strangely quiet about liquor taxes.  It's almost like someone is greasing their palms, or something.  Nah, that's crazy conspiracy talk, right?

2026 UPDATE:  Looks like Scotland's minimum unit pricing was more successful on balance than was originally thought, though probably would have been even more successful had it been two-tier.  And of course, in the USA, where hard liquor is relatively cheap now, it would almost certainly have a net benefit overall.  But as the saying goes, the devil is always in the details.

Saturday, December 9, 2017

Who's Afraid of Cheap, Legal Weed?

Aside from the usual suspects (Big Alcohol, Big Pharma, and of course the illegal drug cartels), who stand to lose the most from cannabis legalization and/or falling cannabis prices, as well as those who simply oppose cannabis in general, there have also been some legitimate public health researchers such as Mark Kleiman who also seem to fear it--specifically the "cheap" part, not the "legal" part.  The fear here is that, while legalization per se may be a non-problem, a large price drop may lead to a significant increase in heavy cannabis use and related problems, at least in theory. But we don't really see much reason to worry.  

Of course, prior to Colorado and Washington's cannabis legalization, there had been a widespread belief that before-tax prices would plummet by at least half, and perhaps even 80% or more, upon legalization or very shortly after.  And yet, that did not happen--yet.  If anything, prices went up at first due to higher demand in the short term, and with or without taxes the prices three years later still have not dropped nearly as much as predicted compared with the status quo ante, at least not at the retail level.

And while the price elasticity of demand for cannabis remains controversial to this day, it is generally thought to be relatively inelastic overall, though estimates vary dramatically.   Note that all estimates were calculated during the time of prohibition and do not always adjust for potency.  There may very well be a relatively "elastic zone" above a certain price point, such as the average price during the 1980s and early 1990s when usage rates dropped, but any further decreases from current levels are squarely in the "inelastic zone".  In fact, even before legalization, the typical cost per buzz-hour was already cheaper than beer.

Still, the long-term trend in cannabis prices does seem to be downward, both in legalization states and nationwide.  And contrary to what the fearmongers like to claim, that is not necessarily a bad thing, given how cannabis is overall safer than alcohol, and generally tends to substitute for it.  Many studies strongly suggest that when one advances, the other retreats, albeit with some nuance.  Cannabis may even take a major bite out our nation's deadly and devastating opioid epidemic as well, according to some studies.  Thus, cheaper weed, especially if it is legal, may very well be a net public health and safety benefit on balance.   And there is also no hard evidence that teen cannabis use has increased as a result of legalization--on the contrary, the latest NSDUH data find that cannabis use among 12-17 year olds nationally has dropped to a 22-year low, even as it has risen significantly among both 18-25 year olds and those 26 and over since 2008.

As for heavy use, the definition of that term varies, but for argument's sake let's use Mark Kleiman's "daily or near-daily" (DND) use definition of 20+ times per month.  He notes how the rate of past-month use among adults is roughly the same as it was in the early 1990s, but within that group the proportion of DND users has apparently increased fourfold by 2014.  And yes, heavy users would be the most sensitive to price as a rule, since they spend a more significant chunk of their incomes on weed than non-heavy users.   But this increase occured almost entirely during prohibition, and now it seems like the market for heavy use is quite saturated even with legalization and falling prices.  So heavy use is unlikely to increase much more (if at all) going forward, regardless of price or legal status.

So how far will the price ultimately fall?  Well, consider this.  Take a look at the price by weight of various products in your local grocery store.  For example, think "parsley, sage, rosemary, and thyme" (like the song), and of course oregano and tea bags--all of which are typically just a few dollars per ounce (which works out to mere pennies per gram), compared to cannabis at $100/oz. for low-grade and $300+/oz. for high-grade (i.e. $1600-5000/lb.) despite it being roughly as easy to grow as basil.  That's a roughly 100-fold difference!  The notable exception to this rule is saffron, which is about $1000-5000/lb. but that is because it is made from just the pistils of the crocus flower and thus requires a LOT of flowers, and a little bit goes a very long way.  But for cannabis, once the industry becomes fully developed, the current artificial scarcity caused by tight regulation and licensing will dissipate, and the inevitable (albeit delayed) drop in price will happen, sooner or later.   Exactly how much is anyone's guess, and depends on supply and demand as well as taxation, but down it will go, most likely by a lot.  Perhaps even so low that a "dime bag" would literally cost a dime (before taxes), though demand would most likely buoy the price at least somewhat higher than that.  

Thus, an 80-90% price crash at some point in the not-too-distant future is really not too farfetched.  If that happens, then the average potency would also likely drop from its currently high levels.  What would be the point of using energy-intensive indoor growing methods to force the THC percentage levels well into the double-digits and even into the twenties, when decent bud can be produced much more cheaply and efficently via outdoor growing or in literal greenhouses?  After all, the whole point of high-potency weed is more "bang for the buck", as well as making it easier to conceal.  At the same time, bunk weed would be, well, weeded out.  And specialty products such as edibles and vape products will likely increase in production, as the cost of producing them will go down due to cheaper crude cannabis prices.

And for those who are concerned about a hypothetical Big Tobacco-style supervillain cannabis industry somehow endangering public health?   Well, if the price really does plummet as much as researchers predict, it would really take the profit out of it at the same time, so this hypothetical "Big Pot" would not get very far.   Thus, Twenty-One Debunked believes "don't fear the reefer", no matter how cheap and readily avaliable it may eventually become.

Wednesday, December 5, 2012

Would a Price Floor Be a Good Idea Here?

Recently, UK Prime Minister David Cameron has begun to support the idea of setting a minimum price per unit of alcohol, which currently does not exist in Britain.  The rationale is that it would cut down on excessive drinking and related problems.  Clearly, Britain’s binge-drinking culture (affecting all ages, not just youth) is nothing short of outrageous, even by American standards, though it has improved somewhat in the past decade.   The alcohol taxes in the UK have actually risen faster than inflation in recent years, but supermarkets continue to get around that by selling cheap alcohol at a loss (aka "loss leading") to attract more customers, in a race to the bottom that the overtaxed and declining pubs can never possibly win.  So a price floor seems like a great idea, at least in the UK.

Would that also be a good idea on this side of the pond as well?  Certainly the proposed price floor of 0.40-0.50 pounds per British unit of alcohol (which would be $1.12-$1.42 per American standard drink) would be a bit steep, at least for off-premise alcohol.  A case of 24 beers would be at least $27, similar to the price in Ontario, Canada, and about double the current price for the cheapest beer in much of the USA.  Not only would that idea be unlikely to fly in this country, it may not even be necessary to make set the floor that high to reap significant public health benefits.  Alcohol prices are currently significantly lower in the USA than in the UK (mostly due to our very low alcohol taxes), and the cost of living is lower in the USA as well.  American teenagers and young adults are also significantly poorer than their British counterparts, at least those in the bottom 90%. 

Twenty-One Debunked currently supports (and has always supported) raising and equalizing the alcohol taxes to $21 per proof-gallon for all alcoholic beverages, the same level as the distilled spirits tax was in 1991 adjusted for inflation.  That would push up the price of beer by about $1.20 per six-pack and $4.80 per case, wine by $1.00 per 750-mL bottle, and liquor by $1.00 per 750-mL bottle.  Microbrewers would be exempt from any such tax hike, since their products are already pretty expensive and as small businesses they would be the least able to absorb a tax hike.   A price floor would probably be a good complement to such a policy, and $1.00 (at most) per standard drink would make sense for non-bulk alcohol.  For bulk alcohol (more than an 18-pack of beer or more than 1 gallon of wine or more than 750 mL of spirits), a floor of $0.50-$0.75 would be better, especially since we support keeping the purchase age at 20 or 21 for bulk alcohol while lowering it to 18 otherwise.  This combination of policies is really not all that different in principle from the main idea discussed in Kenkel (1993), yet far more practical and equitable overall.  And bars and restaurants would likely benefit, since pre-gaming with cheap off-premise booze would be reduced.